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ABSTRACT
Egypt has a large food subsidy program that has created a relatively effective social
safety net, but it has also drained budgetary resources and proved to be poorly targeted
toward the poor.  Discussions about reforming the system to improve its effectiveness
have run into extreme political sensitivities surrounding the issue of food subsidies.  Egypt,
therefore, well illustrates the quandaries that policymakers and others contemplating food
subsidy reform face in developing countries. This study examines the political economy of
food subsidy reform in Egypt and discusses the economic and political advantages and
disadvantages of nine possible reforms.  The study concludes that the reforms that have
the greatest chance of success are those that reduce the access of the wealthy while
increasing the access of the truly needy, but the timing, sequence, and trade-offs of such
reforms have to be taken into account before they are implemented.v
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments .................................................... vii
1.  Introduction .......................................................1
2.  The Political Economy of Food Subsidy Reform ............................5
Subsidy Cuts and Violence ..........................................6
Political Factors Contributing to Successful Policy Reform ..................8
3.  Review of the Political and Economic Context of Food Subsidy Reform
   in Egypt .....................................................14
Historical Background ............................................15
Expansion of the Subsidy System ....................................17
The 1977 Riots .................................................18
Subsidy Reduction Phase ..........................................20
Current Context: Food Subsidy Policies ...............................22
Poor Targeting .............................................24
Leakage and Waste .........................................25
Wheat Market Distortions ....................................26
Current Context: The State of  Policy Reform ..........................27
4.  Political Dynamics of Food Subsidy Reform in Egypt .......................31
5.  Options for Food Subsidy Policy Reform ................................36
Oil and Sugar Subsidies ...........................................37
Baladi Bread and Flour ...........................................39
Other Options ..................................................44
6.  Conclusions ......................................................45
TABLE
1 Comparison of policy options for food subsidy reform ....................49vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My thanks are due to my colleagues at IFPRI whose work on various aspects of
Egypt's food security and food subsidy program greatly contributed to this paper.  In
particular, I  thank Akhter Ahmed, Chief of Party of IFPRI's food security research project
in Egypt, for his input, assistance, and suggestions.  I am also grateful for comments on
earlier drafts from Shafika Nasser, Salwa Gomaa, Lawrence Haddad, Mylene Kherallah,
and Diane Singerman. 
Tammi Gutner
Visiting Research Fellow
International Food Policy Research Institute1
  Increases in food prices have resulted in violent protests in countries including Dominican Republic
1
(1994), Egypt (1977), Indonesia (1998), Jordan (1989, 1996), Liberia (1979), Morocco (1981, 1984), Peru
(1978), Sudan (1979, 1982), Tunisia (1984), Yemen (1998), Zambia (1986), and Zimbabwe (1988). 
1.  INTRODUCTION
It is common knowledge among policymakers in developing countries that
expanding consumer subsidy programs is always politically easier than reducing them. This
has been particularly salient in the case of food subsidy reform, since in the past 25 years
there are numerous examples of government attempts to reduce food subsidies that have
ignited violent protests, often seen by policymakers as politically destabilizing.   Yet
1
despite the political benefits of food subsidy programs, they often perform poorly at their
ostensible task of providing a safety net for the truly needy, while they also tend to be
costly, presenting a significant drain on government expenditures. External donor actors,
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are often one of the main sources of
pressure for food subsidy reform, proposed within broader structural adjustment
programs.  The dilemma facing policymakers with large food subsidy programs  is
whether, when, and how these programs can be reformed without sparking political
unrest.  It is also a question of interest to donors looking to encourage food subsidy
reform in recipient countries, as well as scholars seeking to better understand the political
and economic factors that contribute to the success or failure of policy reform in
developing countries.2
  Wheat is the foundation of the Egyptian diet.  Baladi bread and flour are 82 percent extraction.  
2
This paper examines the political economy of food subsidy reform efforts in Egypt. 
Egypt provides a case of a country with a large food subsidy program that has been
relatively effective as a social safety net, but a program that is also expensive and poorly
targeted to the poor.  Policy discussions about reform strategies to improve the system's
performance run into the extreme political sensitivity of the issue of food subsidies in
Egypt.  Egypt is therefore a country that well illustrates the dilemmas facing policymakers
and others contemplating food subsidy reform in developing countries. 
The food subsidy system in Egypt currently covers four staples: the flat baladi
bread, baladi flour, cooking oil, and sugar.   The problems besetting the current system
2
include high absolute costs, which stood at LE 3.7 billion in 1996/97 in current prices,
roughly corresponding to total earnings from tourism (Ahmed, Bouis, and Gutner 1999);
poor targeting vis-à-vis the needy; evidence of considerable leakage of subsidized foods
before they reach consumers; and distortions to domestic wheat and milling sectors caused
by the subsidized bread and flour programs. Although there is widespread agreement
among policymakers, donors, and other political actors that the subsidy program should be
reformed to function more efficiently and better target the poor, the political sensitivity of
food subsidy policy in Egypt has challenged the government to find strategies of reform
that are perceived to be politically feasible.
Why is food subsidy policy so politically sensitive in Egypt? First, and most
important, since the Nasser era, the state has made explicit its mandate to ensure basic3
 According to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) data, Egypt was the world's top importer of
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wheat and wheat flour in 1997/98, and was the second largest importer in 1996/97 (USDA 1999). Currently,
Egypt imports just under 50 percent of total wheat consumption. 
food supplies for all Egyptians (Khouri-Dager 1996).  Over time, Egypt's provision of
subsidized bread in particular has become a powerful symbol of the broader social contract
between the government and the population, in a political system where political
participation is highly limited. As Singerman (1995) has noted, "The Egyptian
Government's policies of political exclusion have gone hand in hand with their public
commitment to provide for the basic needs of the population....(T)he government
maintains its legitimacy by providing goods and services to the population."  As a result,
food subsidies in Egypt, especially those for bread and flour, are perceived to be important
in promoting political stability.  Indeed, sharp increases in the price of food staples and
other products in 1977 ignited riots in Egypt that were seen as regime threatening.  The
riots left a legacy of government caution and gradualism on strategies not only for food
policy reform, but economic reform more broadly. 
Second, the provision of subsidized wheat and wheat flour, major components of
Egypt's food subsidy system, has been a particular challenge to the government. 
Historically, Egypt's self-sufficiency in wheat has been low, leaving Egyptian food security
vulnerable to swings in international wheat prices.  Indeed, currently, Egypt is one of the
world's top wheat importers.   Finally, Egypt is in the midst of a far-reaching process of
3
economic reform and structural adjustment that has heightened the importance of food
subsidies as a component of the social safety net.  Indicators of political unrest—such as4
illegal strikes—have also increased since the reform process began, contributing to
government caution about tinkering with the food subsidy system.  
Egypt has, in fact, quietly reformed its food subsidy system over the past 20 years
from one that was economically unsustainable to one that poses a more modest drain on
government expenditures.  Food subsidy costs have declined to around 5 percent of
government expenditures in recent years, from a high of 14 percent in 1981-82.  Egyptian
food subsidies are also widely credited with guaranteeing affordable staples to the
population and helping to reduce infant mortality and malnutrition (World Bank 1995).
Yet, there is clearly scope for more reform. 
This paper suggests that there is a "pool" of politically feasible policy options that
can meet the twin goals of reforming Egypt's food subsidy system so that it better targets
the poor while functioning more efficiently.  This "pool" of options can be nested in a
broader set of options that have been proposed or discussed by policymakers, researchers,
and other actors, which include more economically efficient options that are seen as
having low political acceptability, as well as politically acceptable options that may also
increase the program's costs.  Different combinations of these options can be designed to
reflect the ways that policy goals are prioritized, in terms of whether the emphasis is
political feasibility or cost savings.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. It begins by examining the
broader issue of the political economy of food subsidy reform.  Turning to the case of
Egypt, it reviews  the economic and political context of food subsidy reform in Egypt5
since World War II, in order to highlight the factors that have shaped past and current
reform issues and options.  Section 4 examines the political dynamics of subsidy reform in
Egypt, before turning in Section 5 to the description and evaluation of a number of food
policy reform options.  
2.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOOD SUBSIDY REFORM
The relationship between subsidy cuts and other economic reform policies on
political stability is complex, and depends greatly on the specific economic and political
climate a country faces when its government is considering and implementing policy
reform.  Different actors hurt by economic reforms can disrupt the process in a number of
ways, some of which can be more harmful than others.  Labor can strike, low-income
groups and students can riot, private-sector actors can move their capital out of the
country, and public-sector actors can hoard (Waterbury 1989).  Unfortunately, it is
difficult for anyone to know exactly what the thresholds are at which disruptive actions are
triggered, or intensify.  Existing studies tend to be stronger in highlighting the challenges
governments face in attempting policy reforms, and identifying factors and actors that
influence political responses to reforms, versus specifying the relative strength of different
causal mechanisms that may shape these responses.6
  The authors examined nine major cases where subsidy cuts resulted in violence in the period 1976-
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84, as well as other cases where subsidy cuts did not result in violence.
SUBSIDY CUTS AND VIOLENCE
To date, little research has been undertaken that seeks to determine the relationship
between consumer subsidy cuts and political stability in developing countries.  One
existing study that compared cases where subsidy cuts resulted in violence argued that
riots tended to be inconsequential for political stability, mainly because most riots were
spontaneous, and therefore difficult to sustain (Bienen and Gersovitz 1986).   The authors
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found that in cases of violent responses to subsidy cuts, protesters rarely had an agenda
beyond annulling the price increases.  At the same time, and not surprisingly, protests
often revealed broader resentment toward the government.
More recent events like the demise of the Suharto regime in Indonesia call this
argument into question.  It may be the case that regime change is rarely a direct result of
consumer subsidy cuts, but this does not explain why negative public response to subsidy
cuts can sometimes explode into something more destabilizing.  In the Indonesian case,
sudden increases in the prices of fuel and electricity by up to 70 percent incensed
Indonesians, and was the match that ignited deeper discontent about the regime.  Student
protests quickly spread to include other interest groups, which together called for ousting
the old regime (Economist, May 1998).
In addition, in most cases where subsidy cuts result in violence, the subsidy cuts are
rescinded, which may explain why such protests are rarely regime-threatening.  Empirical7
evidence showing the opaqueness of a direct link between subsidy protests and regime
changes also does not account for the extent to which such protests play a role in
weakening a government, and making it more vulnerable to other challenges to its
survival.
Despite their weak argument, Bienen and Gersovitz provide useful data on common
factors shared by almost all cases where food price increases resulted in riots.  First, the
authors found that in almost all of the cases where food price increases resulted in riots,
the price increases were large (over 25 percent), immediate, and above rates of inflation. 
In the cases they analyzed, there were no examples of government officials killed during
the riots, nor of rioters being armed.  In most of the cases of violent protest, subsidy
reductions were rescinded, but more moderate price increases were ultimately
implemented within months of the riots, and usually without protest.  Violent protests
lasted anywhere from a few days to more than two weeks, and began in both capital cities
and provincial cities.  The authors also found that major violence over food issues
occurred relatively more in the North Africa region, while protests in Latin America have
focused more on fuel products and transport costs, and often reflect general opposition to
increases in the cost of living. They posit that this occurs for two reasons.  First, many
Latin American countries do not have extensive food subsidy systems, which means there
are fewer opportunities for discontent over food subsidy cuts.  Second, they argue that
Latin American urban and working classes tend to be better organized and developed than8
their North African counterparts, and thus more able to respond to issues like increased
transport or fuel costs (Bienen and Gersovitz 1986).
Finally, the only case in the Middle East and North Africa region where violent
protests directly resulted in regime change is the case of the Sudan in 1985, when
President Nimeiry was forced out by a coup that followed wide protests sparked by an
austerity package that included subsidy cuts.  In this case, Nimeiry announced a 33 percent
increase in bread prices, 66 percent increase in gasoline prices, and price increases in soap,
edible oils, and textiles as well.  Spontaneous reactions from youth were soon augmented
by more sizable crowds, demonstrations, and strikes, which led to demands for Nimeiry's
removal.  While subsidy cuts were not the main cause of instability, they were a trigger
that reflected much deeper dissatisfaction with the president, and the country's economic
policies.  As a result, while subsidy cuts alone may rarely topple regimes, such cuts may be
the critical factor in potentially explosive situations. 
POLITICAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SUCCESSFUL POLICY REFORM
Analysts examining both the politics of subsidy reform and the politics of broader
economic adjustment policies often highlight government commitment to reform and
public perception toward reform as two particularly important variables that explain
success or failure of policy changes.  A third key variable includes the tactics and
strategies used by committed governments to try and shape public support and reduce
public opposition to reform. 9
In terms of government commitment to reform, clearly economic reform efforts
have been most successful in countries where leaders were strongly committed to major
change, and where there was widespread public acceptance or demand for such change. 
Stated differently, people are more willing to accept economic hardship if they are
confident in the government (Graham 1994).  In a study of a number of countries adopting
widespread structural adjustment policies mainly in the 1980s, Nelson argued that they
shared a "reform syndrome" (Nelson 1989).  This was characterized by new governments
taking office with strong public support for major changes, even though there was often
disagreement about the specifics of the reforms.  Analyzing successful food subsidy
reforms, Alderman (1991) also observed that policy shifts were often made possible
following elections in Jamaica, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe, as well as shifts from military to
civilian government in Turkey.
State commitment, however, appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition
for successful reform.  In many cases, political leadership may agree on the necessity of a
particular policy reform, but remain divided about the timing and scope of the policy
changes.  Political leaders may also alienate important interest groups and supporters
when undertaking structural adjustment and other economic reform policies, which can
thwart the success of reforms. Bureaucratic interests can play a pivotal role in terms of
whether reform efforts are implemented well or sabotaged (Waterbury 1989).  As a result,
the tactics and strategies used by political leadership, discussed below,  are critical with
respect to how reforms are implemented and received by the public.10
Public perception of the fairness of a policy change is also critical in determining
public response.  Governments undertaking economic reform are more likely to push
through austerity measures such as food subsidies or wage freezes when people believe
such policy changes are legitimate solutions to the country's economic problems, even if
they cannot see the benefits right away.  Continued public support for policy changes,
however, is dependent on people eventually noticing some tangible improvements in their
lives.  It is therefore incumbent upon the political leadership to organize constituencies
that support their policy actions.  Alderman and Seddon have both noted that so-called
"food" riots—such as those that took place in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Zambia, and
Jordan—were in fact "equity" riots, where the underlying issues had more to do with a
perception that the policy changes were unfair, than the actual policy change (Alderman
1991; Seddon 1986).  While many governments have sought to blame "food" riots on
highly-organized small groups of agitators, existing research shows this is rarely the case.  
Even in cases where governments are strongly committed to change, the strategies
and tactics they adopt to implement new policies can make the difference between success
and failure.  These tactics and strategies give the political leadership maneuvering room to
compensate potential losers, avoid alienating too many political groups at the same time,
reduce opposition to policy reform, and to help to influence public opinion.  Timing,
targeting, and transmission strategies appear to be particularly important in ensuring the
success of food subsidy reform.  11
The timing of a reform has to do with how different policy reforms are sequenced. 
Since every government regime consists of different allied interests, governments
undertaking economic adjustment policies must calculate the impact of policy changes on
members of the ruling coalition.  Successful policy change is then more likely where the
leadership avoids simultaneously hurting the interests of all coalition members.  In the case
of Egypt, the dominant coalition includes organized labor, public-sector managers, private
importers, import-substituting manufacturing interests, and the military.  Subsistence
farmers are absent from the ruling coalition, and capitalist farmers and the civil service are
neutral actors (Waterbury 1989).
In a broader process of economic adjustment, strategies can include sequencing
reforms, so that not all powerful supporting interest groups are hurt at the same time.  In
addition, the political leadership may also make concessions to some of these groups, as a
means of encouraging their support.  Violence in the wake of policy reforms is less likely
to be self-sustaining if a wide variety of social groups do not have strong incentives to join
on board.  Implicit in Waterbury's argument is the idea that the reduction of consumer
subsidies is a secondary priority in phasing in a broader set of structural adjustment
policies.  Often IMF-supported adjustment programs begin with devaluation and domestic
budget cuts.  This phase tends to increase the cost of living, which consumer subsidies
help to offset.  In addition, the austerity resulting from initial policy adjustments also
enhances the importance of consumer subsidies as social safety nets.  The phasing in of
various policy reforms, then, helps to spread the burden of adjustment.12
Joan Nelson argues that governments moving from general subsidies to targeted
subsidies must set targets widely as a means of reducing the political risk associated with
policy changes (Nelson et al. 1989).  General subsidies can benefit the nonpoor as well as
the poor, and therefore better-targeted subsidies can help governments transfer more
resources to the truly needy, while at the same time enjoying cost savings.  However, a
change from general to targeted subsidies risks alienating some nonpoor who benefit from
general subsidies.  Protests over food price increases, she notes, rarely consist of the poor
alone.  Instead, such protests mobilize students, workers, and even middle-class and
upper-class groups. Targeting that includes broad portions of the middle income groups,
as well as the poor, will reduce the political opposition associated with moving from a
general to a targeted system.  It is therefore a relatively more risk-averse approach than a
policy of directly targeting the needy.
Compensation is also a common approach by governments who seek to reduce
opposition from interest groups who lose in the wake of policy changes.  In the area of
food subsidy reform, one example of this is the case of Pakistan. When Pakistan ended its
flour rationing system, it added a compensation program that initially totaled 80 percent of
the costs of the previous system.  Pakistan as well as Sri Lanka also increased salaries of
some government workers while reducing subsidies, while in Turkey changes in food
prices have been linked to tax benefits (Alderman 1991).  Often, governments have more
incentive to compensate the well-organized, vocal, and politically powerful groups, even
though these may not be the most needy.  At the same time, governments can also use13
  Graham's arguments are based on her analysis of case studies of sources of failure and success in
5
the implementation of market-based reforms and safety net programs in Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Senegal,
Zambia, and Poland.
  For example, wage increases can be inflationary.
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compensation techniques to create what Graham (1994) has called "new political space"
for the poor, which can give them a stake in the reform process.  For example,
governments that invite NGOs to help implement safety net programs for the poor are also
creating more channels of access to the government, which can increase political support
from the poor, and therefore enhance the political acceptance of economic reform.   An
5
example of this in the area of food policy might be creating a program of food-for-
education that is directly targeted to vulnerable and needy groups. The danger with
compensation programs, however, is when their costs erase any economic savings from
reducing subsidies, or have other negative economic side effects.
6
Political scientists and other analysts disagree on effectiveness of government
dialogue and explanation as a means to cushion the effect of subsidy cuts and other
economic adjustment policies.  Some argue that careful explanation and dialogue with
middle-class groups is essential when benefits such as subsidies are being withdrawn from
them (Nelson et al. 1989; Alderman 1991).  The argument here is that if, in fact, food riots
are equity riots, then negative public reactions can be reduced through public explanation
and discussion. There are numerous cases where riots over food subsidy reduction or
removal occurred when price increases were sudden and unannounced.  Stated differently,14
  Ibrahim and Lofgren refer specifically to the case of Egypt in their study.  
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governments can increase public support for painful policy actions if they present a clear
vision of how today's pain will translate into future benefits (Ibrahim and Lofgren 1996).
7
Yet, there is also an argument that declarations of policy goals, along with
timetables, may give opposition more time to organize and react, and reduce the room for
maneuvering available to the leadership.  Obfuscation of policy intentions can be important
in cases where public announcement may cause these policies to be aborted, as in the case
of future exchange rate devaluations, for example (Roe, Roy, and Sengupta 1989).  As
discussed below, Egypt is an example of a country that has made significant reforms in its
food subsidy policy without public announcements.  The following section reviews the
economic and political context of Egypt's food subsidy system, and shows how
government policy since the 1977 riots reflects many of the lessons suggested above. 
3.  REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF FOOD
SUBSIDY REFORM IN EGYPT
The Egyptian government's involvement in consumer food subsidies started as early
as the years following World War I, when the government responded to rising food prices
by importing large quantities of wheat and flour from Australia, and selling it at a loss in
government-owned shops in 1919-1920 (Scobie 1981).  Since World War II, there have
been two main phases in the history of Egypt's food subsidy system: the growth of the
system to unsustainable levels by the early 1980s, and since then, the gradual contraction15
  Scobie notes that soil fertility was poor after the war, due to the scarcity of fertilizer.
8
of the system to its current levels.  This contraction has been undertaken quietly and
gradually, to reduce prospects for political unrest.    
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Food rationing began as a temporary measure in Egypt in 1941, with a goal of
helping Egyptians cope with scarcity and inflation resulting from World War II.  The initial
system was not targeted to the poor, but was instead set up to provide necessities such as
sugar, kerosene, edible oil, and tea (Ali and Adams 1996).  Wheat, in turn, was not
rationed, but was subsidized in the years following the war, particularly at times when
local shortage increased domestic wheat prices, such as in the late 1940s and early 1950s
8
(Alderman, von Braun, and Sakr 1982; Scobie 1981).  Following President Gamal Abdel
Nasser's "July Revolution" in 1952, agrarian reforms marked the beginning of extensive
government involvement in the production, marketing, and distribution of most
agricultural products, which lasted until the start of liberalization of state agriculture in
1987 (Badiane, Kherallah, and Abdel-Latif 1998).  
The food subsidy system expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, becoming part of a
broader set of consumer welfare programs that also subsidized transport, housing, energy,
and some nonfood consumer products, such as soap and cigarettes.  These policies helped
to hold consumer prices down in the face of urbanization and rapid population growth.   16
  U.S. relations with Egypt deteriorated during Lyndon Johnson's presidency.  Johnson was concerned
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with Nasser's moves to support "revolutionaries" fighting in Yemen, his dependence on Soviet arms, and his
growing hostility toward the U.S. (Johnson 1971).  Egypt, in turn, saw demonstrations against U.S. policy at
the time, and Nasser was concerned about U.S. interference in Egypt's internal politics.  When Johnson
ignored Nasser's request for wheat assistance in 1964, Nasser launched a strong attack against U.S. policy.
U.S. aid, including P.L. 480 grain imports, resumed in 1973 after Egypt realigned itself with the U.S.
In the mid-1960s, ration cards were introduced for a small number of goods, in
response to rising domestic prices, which were influenced in part by the discontinuance of
U.S. food aid at the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Alderman, von Braun, and Sakr
1982).  The United States curtailed its P.L. 480 food aid program in 1965, amid
deteriorating U.S-Egyptian relations, and used short extensions until aid was stopped in
February 1967.   As a result, Egypt was forced to use foreign exchange reserves to pay for
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grain imports, and consequently fell into arrears in making payments on its foreign debt. 
Wheat and flour imports in 1965-66 totaled LE 55 million, which was greater than all
Egyptian exports to the West (at LE 52 million) in the same period (Waterbury 1983). 
The ration cards initially did not always involve price subsidies, and were designed
as a quantity-rationing system to shield people against shortages.  In general, under
Nasser, spending on food subsidies remained a modest percentage of the government's
budget, and the role of food subsidy policies was primarily to ensure the supply of
essential food items.  
Egypt's self-sufficiency in wheat, however, began to decline in the 1960s. Wheat
imports began exceeding domestic production in 1963, and at its nadir in 1983, Egypt
produced less than 20 percent of its wheat needs (Scobie 1981; Badiane, Kherallah, and
Abdel-Latif 1998).  The result of declining self-sufficiency in wheat and increasing demand17
for wheat meant that Egypt became increasingly dependent on wheat imports from the
mid-1960s onward. Wheat imports had become the government's responsibility in 1961,
when it nationalized all foreign trade, and growing wheat imports used scarce foreign
exchange reserves, leaving the country vulnerable to swings in international wheat prices
and stocks.
EXPANSION OF THE SUBSIDY SYSTEM  
The food subsidy system grew significantly, in scope and cost, under President
Anwar Sadat, who took power in 1970.  A broader set of foods were brought under the
subsidy umbrella, including beans, lentils, frozen fish, meat and chicken, as well as rice and
yellow maize.  At its peak, the subsidy system included 18 foods. 
Food security became a major policy issue in Egypt in 1972, as world wheat prices
skyrocketed from $60 a ton to $250 a ton by 1973, and Egypt's wheat imports surged
from $147 million to $400 million (Sadowski 1991).  Overall, expenditures on food
subsidies jumped from LE 3 million in 1970/71 (only 0.2 percent of total government
expenditure) to LE 1.4 billion in 1980/81, which accounted for 14 percent of total
government expenditure (Alderman, von Braun, and Sakr 1982; Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali
1998).
THE 1977 RIOTS18
The infamous 1977 riots deeply unnerved Egyptian policymakers and left a legacy
of government caution not only toward food policy reform, but economic reform more
broadly.  The riots illustrate all of the strategies policymakers should avoid in reforming
food subsidy policy: that is, high, sharp, price increases in a political context where the
public perceives the changes to be inequitable.  Although the riots are commonly termed
"food riots," as noted above, they were in fact "equity riots" since the underlying issues
had more to do with the perception that the policy change was unfair, rather than the
actual policy change itself.  Indeed, the price increases announced in January 1977 did not
include increases in a number of subsidized staples, such as baladi bread, beans, lentils,
rationed sugar, or cooking oil.  Price increases were announced for fino bread (50
percent), 72 percent extraction (refined) flour (67 percent), regulated sugar (4 percent),
rationed rice (20 percent), tea (subsidy canceled), cooking oil (46 percent), gasoline
(26–31 percent), and cigarettes (different amounts) (Alderman 1986).  
The subsidy cuts stemmed from negotiations between the government and the IMF
in 1976 over a package of economic reforms for the economy. Subsidy cuts were part of
the package, although the actual policies that sparked the riots were more modest than
those the IMF initially proposed (Sadowski 1991).  Indeed, Deputy Premier for Financial
and Economic Affairs Abd al-Munaim Qaissuni, who announced the subsidy cuts, felt he
was lifting subsidies from a list of "luxury" goods that included commodities like macaroni
and fino bread, and estimated that the price increases would cost very little to the average
Egyptian family (Waterbury 1983).  Egyptians, however, were shocked and angry about19
the LE 277 million subsidy cuts, given unfulfilled government promises of prosperity
under Sadat's Open Door Policy. 
Those who rioted were neither communists, as portrayed by some, nor starving
masses portrayed by others.  Rather, they were industrial workers, students and public-
sector employees who felt the subsidy cuts were unfair, and were soon joined by others as
well, including lower income people (Sadowski 1991).  Rioting flared up on January 18,
1977, in various places along the Nile Valley, but mainly in Cairo and in Alexandria.  In
Cairo, workers, students, and others smashed windows and attacked trolleys and police
stations, and protesters throughout the country attacked government offices and
government officials' homes.  Police fired into the crowds and the military was called in to
try to restore order.  The violence only ended when the government backed down and
rescinded the subsidy cuts on January 20.  
Sadat's response to the riots was to expand the subsidy system further, in an effort
to placate the public and counter widespread public criticism that his government was not
doing enough to promote social equity.  Food subsidies came to be seen as both a safety
net to protect the poor, as well as an important tool in the promotion of social equity.  For
example, the 1978-82 Five-Year Plan listed as two of the government's five most
important tasks "to protect the consumer from price increases," and "to make available to
the public necessary food items" (Sadowski 1991).
SUBSIDY REDUCTION PHASE20
  Recent, revised estimates derived by IFPRI, by contrast, indicate that food subsidies were only 13.9
10
percent of total government expenditure in 1980/81 (Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali 1998).
The costs of the expanding system continued to grow and the subsidy system was
becoming increasingly unsustainable by the time President Hosni Mubarak took office in
1981.  Mubarak was faced with the daunting task of easing the acute economic burden it
imposed.  Government data at the time showed food subsidies in 1980/81 accounted for
almost 20 percent of total current expenditure, which contributed to persistent budget
deficits (Alderman, von Braun, and Sakr 1982).   By 1981/82, 99 percent of the
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population had ration cards, of which 97 percent were the more highly subsidized green
ration cards (Abdel-Latif and El-Laithy 1996).  The strain of paying for growing wheat
and flour imports with scarce foreign exchange became even more pressing during the
1980s, as Egypt's foreign debt and debt service obligations grew. By 1989, for example,
Egypt's foreign debt totaled $46 billion, and its debt service ratio (total debt as a
percentage of current account receipts) was 46 percent (IMF 1991). 
In 1982, Mubarak initiated a process of reforming the food subsidy system, which
he launched by holding a seminar on national economic issues to seek the advice of
prominent Egyptian officials, businessmen, and intellectuals (Sadowski 1991).  There was
agreement at this conference that Egypt's persistent budget deficits must be tackled in
order to reduce inflation and high levels of foreign borrowing.  In addition, rising subsidy
costs were seen as a key contributor to the deficit problem.  21
During this period, and over the next decade, Mubarak's advisers developed several
strategies to gradually reform the subsidy system.  The broad approach they adopted was
a slow transformation of the system as a means to avoid political protest.  This approach,
according to senior Egyptian officials involved in its development, was based on the
assumption that the most important obstacle to subsidy reduction was public perception,
and a gradual strategy would not lead people to worry that their living standards were
being sharply reduced (Sadowski 1991). The government's specific strategies since the
early 1980s have included
1. Attempts to better target the ration card system by introducing in 1981 the red
ration cards, which offered a lower subsidy on goods such as sugar, cooking oil,
tea, and rice than the existing green card.  The red cards are intended for people in
higher income professions. 
2. A reduction in the number of subsidized foods.  Meat, chicken, fish, and other foods
mainly consumed by higher income groups were removed from the subsidy
program.  Subsidies on meat were removed in 1990/91, those on fish and tea in
1991/92, and those on rice in 1992.  
3. Reductions in the number of people on the ration card system.  These were cut back
from 99 percent in the early 1980s to around 70 percent in 1998, as a result of
reductions in 1981, 1994, and 1997.  This was accomplished in part by canceling22
cards owned by people who had died or were abroad.  In 1989, the Ministry of
Trade and Supply stopped adding newborns to the ration card system.
4. A slow reduction in subsidies through various techniques, such as gradually
reducing the quantity of the particular subsidized good, in some cases gradually
replacing it by a more expensive version.  An example of this is the increase in the
price of bread from 1 piaster to 2 piasters in 1985, without protest.  The
government's strategy was to introduce a higher quality 2 piaster loaf alongside the
1 piaster loaf.  Over time, the old loaf became harder to find, and its quality had
deteriorated. Finally, the 1 piaster loaf was no longer produced, and most people
had switched over to the widely available 2 piaster version without complaint
(Sadowski 1991).  Bread prices were further increased by the same strategy to 5
piasters in 1988-89, also without protest.  
Other examples of this quiet reform process for baladi bread include decreases in
loaf size, changes in extraction rates, and more recently, the addition of maize flour in
some selected areas.  In addition, in 1996 the government introduced larger, unsubsidized
versions of fino bread and 72 percent extraction flour and of shami bread and its related
76 percent extraction flour.  
CURRENT CONTEXT: FOOD SUBSIDY POLICIES
The result of these small but frequent policy steps has been, between 1981/82 and
1996/97, a significant reduction in the number of subsidized foods to the current four, a23
 For more detailed results, see Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali (1998).   
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decline in real subsidy costs from a peak of LE 6.0 billion to just under LE 2.5 billion (in
constant 1991/92 prices), and a decline from 14 percent to 5.5 percent of total
government expenditures (Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali 1998).  Egypt's food security has also
been aided by the gradual liberalization of wheat input and output markets since 1987,
which has resulted in a dramatic tripling of domestic wheat production between the early
1980s and 1995 (Badiane, Kherallah, and Abdel-Latif 1998). 
Despite these improvements, there is still significant scope for further improvement
in the food subsidy system.  Recent research undertaken by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI), in collaboration with Egypt's Ministry of Agriculture and Land
Reclamation (MALR)  and Ministry of Trade and Supply (MOTS) shows that the subsidy
system is poorly targeted to the needy, and that there is considerable leakage of subsidized
foods before they reach the consumer.  These were among the conclusions derived from
an integrated household survey (Egypt Integrated Household Survey, or EIHS) carried
out by IFPRI in March-May 1997.  This was a single-round, nationally representative
survey in which questionnaires were administered to 2,500 rural and urban households
from 20 governorates, using a two-stage, stratified selection process.  It collected
information on a wide range of topics, including income, expenditures, food consumption,
nutrition and health status, employment, farming, housing, and the use of food subsidies
by households.
1124
  There are numerous ways to define and measure poverty levels. There is also disagreement among
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economists on which methodologies and definitions are most accurate.  In a study for the Ford Foundation,
Assaad and Rouchdy (1998) analyze the conclusions of several recent studies that seek to estimate poverty
levels in Egypt, and conclude that by whatever standard used, at least 25 percent of Egypt's population is
considered to be poor.  The report notes that research on poverty in Egypt is relatively weak compared with
similar work in other countries, particularly on trends over time. This is mainly due to the political sensitivity
of the topic.
Poor Targeting
Baladi bread and flour subsidies were not designed to serve the poor alone, since
these foods are available to any consumer.  While there is a widespread perception that
self-targeting has resulted in baladi bread and flour being relatively more consumed by the
poor, in fact, the EIHS survey results showed that a high percentage of bread and flour
subsidies goes to the nonpoor.  The better-off 40 percent of the Egyptian population
receive 37 percent of benefits from baladi bread, 40 percent of benefits from baladi flour,
42 percent of subsidized sugar, and 42 percent of subsidized oil (Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali
1998).  A variety of recent studies identify between 25-50 percent of the Egyptian
population as living below the poverty line; the fact that the distribution of subsidy benefits
is not skewed toward a particular income group suggests that there is scope to improve
the amount of benefits received by the poor.
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In contrast to bread and flour subsidies, sugar and oil subsidies are explicitly
designed to be targeted, with the less highly subsidized red cards meant for the richest
Egyptians and the more highly subsidized green cards for others.  Holders of red cards
include investors, owners of estates, shops, automobiles and more than 10 feddans, and25
Egyptians working in embassies or joint venture companies.  Around 70 percent of the
population benefits from the ration card system.  
However, available data show that the card system is also poorly targeted in a number
of ways. First, despite a general assumption that the 25 percent not covered by the ration
cards system consists of high income citizens, there is evidence that even poor households
do not hold any ration cards. One obstacle has been the pervasive long-term problem the
government has had in identifying the poor. Studies have also shown that poor families
sometimes find the bureaucratic steps to apply for a ration card to be a large obstacle (Salmi
1991). Data from the EIHS survey show that 11 out of 100 of the poorest quintile of the
population do not carry a ration card, while 15 out of 100 of the second quintile also do not.
Furthermore, over 10 percent of these two lowest quintiles hold red cards. 
Second, the wealthiest 40 percent of the population actually hold more green cards
than red cards.  Over 60 percent of both the top 4  and 5  expenditure quintile hold green
th    th
cards, compared with less than 12 percent that hold red cards.  The remaining 20-30
percent (of the upper 4  and 5  quintile, respectively) hold no cards.  Ultimately, poor
th    th
targeting of the food subsidy system reduces the amount of benefits that would otherwise
be available to the poor (Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali 1998).  
Leakage and Waste
Leakage is defined here as the amount of subsidized foods that do not reach the
consumer; that is, subsidized food that disappears at the wholesale level. Leakage can be26
 Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali (1998) estimate leakage by subtracting the total amount of each subsidized
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food purchased by consumers during the 1997 household survey from the quantities of these foods placed into
the system during the same period by the Ministry of Trade and Supply. Leakage, then, is the difference
between supply and purchases. 
caused by factors such as the diversion of subsidized flour into production of
nonsubsidized bread and pastries, the sale of subsidized or rationed goods at
nonsubsidized prices, and other forms of corruption, as well as losses from transport or
storage.  IFPRI data show that leakage is highest in the baladi flour system, where
estimates put leakage at 30 percent of the total flour entering the system.   Leakage in
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baladi bread, by contrast, is much lower, estimated at 12 percent of total supply for
Egypt.  Leakage for sugar was estimated at a national average of 25 percent, and for
subsidized oil,  the figure was 28 percent (Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali 1998). These levels of
leakage suggest scope for policy improvements to ensure more of the benefits of
subsidized food reach the consumer.  
Wheat Market Distortions
The Egyptian government has made great strides in liberalizing the wheat sector,
which has resulted in sharply higher levels of wheat production and higher self-sufficiency
rates.  However, consumer subsidies on baladi bread and flour reduce the performance of
the wheat market, particularly by making it difficult for local markets to become more
integrated and function more efficiently.  For example, some governorates impose
transportation restrictions on wheat and flour, largely to ensure their required wheat27
deliveries to the government for the production of baladi flour and bread.  These
transportation restrictions increase price instability and discourage stockholding (Badiane,
Kherallah, and Abdel-Latif  1998).
CURRENT CONTEXT: THE STATE OF POLICY REFORM
Egypt began a substantive process of economic reform and structural adjustment in
1991, backed by agreements with the World Bank and IMF.  President Mubarak
supported the IMF and World Bank programs policies for economic reform to counter the
economic slump Egypt experienced in the late 1980s, due in part to the sharp fall in oil
prices in 1986.  By the late 1980s, the economy faced increasing levels of unemployment,
inflation and foreign debt, and falling levels of real income. 
The timing of the government's acceptance of the IMF and World Bank programs
was also linked to significant debt reduction strategies provided by donors in 1990 during
the Gulf War, which helped to make economic reform policies more politically acceptable. 
The U.S. and Arab Gulf state creditors canceled $14 billion of debt in late 1990, followed
in 1991 by an agreement from the Paris Club of creditor countries to cancel an additional
$10 billion over time, while rescheduling a remaining $10 billion (IMF 1991; Ibrahim and
Lofgren 1996).  Egypt's external debt was reduced from $47.6 billion in June 1990 to
around $34 billion in February 1991, and declined to $31 billion by mid-1991 (Amin
1995).  The significant reduction in its external debt allowed Egypt to avoid a rapid28
devaluation of its currency when embarking on its structural adjustment process in 1991,
while increasing its creditworthiness.  
The goal of the economic reform and structural adjustment program was to
promote economic growth by creating a market-based, export-oriented economy.  The
program included measures to promote fiscal and financial-sector reform, trade and price
liberalization, privatization, and deregulation.  The result has been a significant
improvement in Egypt's macroeconomic performance.  Egypt's budget deficit declined to
1.2 percent of GDP by 1996, well below levels of 17 percent of GDP in 1991.  Inflation
declined to 4.6 percent in 1997 from over 22 percent in 1991 (World Bank 1997c; World
Bank 1999).  Real GDP has grown since 1993, achieving a rate of 5.0 percent in 1996/97
(Subramanian 1997). The reform efforts have also resulted in a more stable currency,
significant foreign exchange reserves, and a stronger banking system (Lane 1998). 
Privatization, while moving at a slow pace, has resulted in the government selling or
reducing its stake in many nonfinancial institutions, as well as in the banking and insurance
sectors.  
Despite the positive economic results brought about by the economic reform
process, domestic support for the process among various political parties and social
groups has been mixed.  Sociopolitical unrest—reflected in visible indicators such as
demonstrations, strikes, and riots—did increase sharply in the early 1990s, compared to
previous years, coinciding with the implementation of the structural adjustment and
economic reform programs (Ibrahim and Lofgren 1996).  The implementation of a new29
law on liberalizing agricultural rents, which took effect in September 1997, also sparked 
unrest in the countryside, including mass rallies in Beni Suief, Gharbia, and Menoufia. 
The law ended tenancy contracts based on rent controls and perpetual leases that were
created during the Nasser era, giving landlords the right to increase rents, or regain
control over the land of almost 1 million affected tenant farmers (Economist 1997). 
In addition, the number of violent attacks by Islamic militants increased since 1990,
claiming the lives of leading politicians, intellectuals, and media figures, as well as
hundreds of others (Clarke 1997).  While Islamic activists have been weakened by the
government's security policies, their existence reflects increased frustration with the
regime's limited channels of political expression and  highlights the government's need to
gain support for its reform efforts from various constituencies of social groups (Weiss and
Wurzel 1998).  A number of scholars have argued that the government has been weak in
its efforts to build such support and has not sought sufficient participation from civil
society (Cassandra 1995; Clarke 1997; Ibrahim and Lofgren 1996; Weiss and Wurzel
1998).
Ultimately, the existence of sociopolitical unrest in the wake of economic reform
has heightened the government's interest in keeping the reform process gradual, and
increasing spending for social services.  To help protect vulnerable groups and maintain
political and social stability, in 1991, the government created the Social Fund for
Development (with funding from the World Bank's International Development Association30
 Price increases have affected everything from train tickets (up 40 percent) to electrical batteries (up
14
12 percent), as well as a variety of nonsubsidized foods (Weiss and Wurzel 1998). Other forms of social
assistance provided by the government include a contribution-based social insurance program for mainly
public-sector employees; a social security program covering people not included in the former, such as small
artisans, temporary agricultural workers, and domestic servants; the Sadat Pensions, which provides pensions
of between LE 50 and LE 60 per month to people reaching 65 years of age who are incapacitated, or to
families of people who die before receiving social insurance. The latter, however, has not taken new
beneficiaries since 1980. There is also a monthly pension or short-term assistance, called the Ma-ash Damani,
which targets the poorest of the poor (including orphans and divorcees) who are not eligible for other social
security programs. See Assaad and Rouchdy (1998).
 
  This particular comment was made following unrest in Jordan after bread prices were increased
15
there in August 1996.
[IDA] and other donors) to help finance labor-intensive public works, microenterprise
development, and community services, among other activities. 
Government concern about the social effects of the larger economic reform process
also reduces any pressing need for significant and far-reaching reform of the food subsidy
system, such as the abolishment of subsidies, or a move from the untargeted baladi bread
and flour system to an administratively targeted system that would involve food stamps or
coupons.  Food subsidies, as stated above, have been an important component of the
safety net to help protect the vulnerable and poor.  Indeed, under the IMF agreements,
prices for numerous other goods and services have risen in recent years, further
heightening the importance of cheap food staples to the nonrich.   Government officials,
14
including President Mubarak, have made statements in the past that stressed that bread
subsidies would not be removed (Deutsche Press-Agentur 1996).
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4.  POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF FOOD SUBSIDY REFORM IN EGYPT
Egypt's "quasi-democratic" political system is characterized by a powerful
presidency and a weak legislature dominated by the ruling National Democratic Party
(NPD) (Weiss and Wurzel 1998).  The key political decisionmaker in Egypt is Mubarak,
who has stressed numerous times that bread subsidies will not be removed, while at the
same time playing a leading role in initiating the cautious process of reforming the subsidy
system that began in the early 1980s.  This fits in well with his main concern of
maintaining political stability in Egypt (Weiss and Wurzel 1998).  
The NPD, reflected Mubarak's strategy, has called for better targeting of food
subsidies since the late 1980s.  While political participation in Egypt is highly limited,
Egypt's other political parties do contribute to the formulation of public opinion, and most
have argued that subsidies should be better targeted and used more cost effectively, to
alleviate burdens on the state budget, particularly in the midst of the current economic
reform process.  However, most party opinions are expressed in broad terms, such as the
importance of "rationalizing" the subsidy system to address issues of leakage and waste,
without more specific or technical ideas in terms of how exactly subsidies could be better
targeted to the needy (Nasser and Gomaa 1998).  
The most powerful ministries involved in the food subsidy issue are the MALR,
concerned with agricultural production, and MOTS, which administers the food subsidy
program.  The MALR has traditionally been strongly in favor of reductions in food32
 Author interviews with MALR and MOTS officials, April 15 and May 5, 1998.
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subsidies, because of the negative impact of subsidies on domestic agricultural production. 
Yet senior officials at MOTS are also interested in modifying the food subsidy system in
order to better increase its ability to reach the poor with less leakage and inefficiency. 
According to MOTS officials, trade minister Ahmed Goweili favors some reform in the
subsidy system, but is cautious due to the political sensitivity of the issue.  
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At the same time, currently there is little external pressure on Egypt to undertake a
dramatic reform of its food subsidy system.  This conclusion, based on interviews with
Egypt's major donors and analysis of policy documents (often confidential) highlighting
donors' strategies in the country, is somewhat counterintuitive, in the sense that there is a
perception among many domestic stakeholders that external pressure for subsidy reform is
prevalent (Gutner, Gomaa, and Nasser 1999).
In terms of the politically sensitive issue of baladi bread and flour, no major donors
are calling for the abolishment of subsidies, or an increase in prices.  Donors do support
measures to better target the system to the poor, while reducing its cost, which are in line
with the interests of the MALR and MOTS.  They are also aware that while Egypt's
macroeconomic climate is healthier, unemployment has increased, contributing to the
widespread belief that social conditions must be improved.  
At the same time, donors have pushed for food subsidy reform in the past, and may
reexamine the issue in the future. However, donor leverage has historically been mixed in
Egypt; that is, what donors want and what they are able to achieve are not always the33
 The reduction in aid was related to the fact that Israel proposed U.S. economic aid be gradually
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phased out over 10-12 years, with half the money added to military aid. 
same (Zimmerman 1993; Clarke 1997; Cassandra 1995).  This reflects the fact that the
United States is by far Egypt's largest donor, and its aid to Egypt is driven by the broader
U.S. desire to secure Egypt's support for the 1979 Camp David peace accords with Israel
and to ensure a strategic relationship with Egypt and the U.S.  This geopolitical context
gives Egypt relatively more leeway vis-à-vis donors than it might otherwise have. Egypt is
the second largest recipient of U.S. aid, after Israel.  Since the mid-1980s, Egypt received
around $2.1 billion a year in U.S. aid, of which $1.3 billion was military aid, and $815
million was economic aid, under the Economic Support Fund, provided through the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID).  In 1998, economic aid was reduced to
$775 million, although military aid is unchanged.   Despite this reduction, U.S. aid to
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Egypt dwarfs other sources of assistance.  For example, it compares with around $2.5
billion in aid currently provided by the rest of the donor community combined, which
includes the IMF, World Bank, the European Union, France, Germany, and the African
Development Bank Fund (USAID 1998).
Of the major donors, USAID has been one of the more active in promoting better-
targeted food subsidies, as a component of its Agricultural Policy Reform Program
(APRP).  One of APRP's goals was to target food subsidies to the poorest households. 
USAID officials in Cairo acknowledged that while there was donor pressure on Egypt to
cut back on food subsidies in the early 1990s, by the mid-1990s the issue was less34
  Author interviews with USAID officials, Cairo, Egypt, May 3 and 5 1998.
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  Author interviews with USAID officials, Cairo, Egypt, May 3 and 5 1998.
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  Author interviews with USAID officials, Cairo, Egypt, May 3 and 5 1998.
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  Egyptian debt to Paris Club countries was cut by 15 percent immediately after a May 1991
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agreement, with a second cut of 15 percent occurring after 18 months (November 1992), and a final cut of
20 percent 18 months later (May 1994). The last two cuts were linked to Egypt's economic performance.
pressing, given the improving health of the Egyptian economy.   In addition, in the early
18
1990s USAID was keen on the idea of encouraging Egypt to set up a targeted food
subsidy system—such as one using food stamps or coupons.  Yet, this idea also lost some
of its urgency a few years later, given the perception that such a policy reform was
politically unacceptable.   USAID's view evolved so that by the late 1990s it was seeking
19
ways to assist Egypt in improving the efficiency of its food subsidy program in ways that
safeguarded the poor but were also more cost-effective.
20
The IMF is also a highly influential donor institution in Egypt, in part because its
standby agreements have been necessary for Egypt to receive World Bank loans, and more
recently, compliance with IMF and World Bank stabilization measures was necessary for
the 1992 and 1994 reductions in debt owed to the Paris Club group of Western creditor
countries (Amin 1995).   Food subsidy reform appeared as a component of the 1991 IMF
21
program, as one of many measures to help reduce the government budget deficit. 
However, the necessity of removing food subsidies declined in importance, and the most
recent standby agreement—from the period October 1996-September 1998—did not
mention food subsidy reform. 35
  IDA provides assistance to countries with per capita income of $785, or less (constant 1996 dollars).
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A third major donor in Egypt is the World Bank.  While its judgment on Egypt's
structural adjustment reforms has been linked to IMF disbursements and the Paris Club's
relief program (Weiss and Wurzel 1998), in many ways its strategies have been more
modest vis-à-vis the United States or IMF.  World Bank lending to Egypt has declined in
recent years, due to the government's decision to reduce its borrowing as part of its debt
management strategy, as well as the availability of high levels of grant and concessional
resources from other donors—particularly the United States.  World Bank average annual
lending commitments to Egypt in the period FY95-97 averaged $110 million, down from
$375 million in 1992.  In addition, Egypt's access to IDA, the Bank's soft-lending arm, is
being phased out after 1999, due to the country's access to other forms of external
financing, and its per capita income of around $1,060.   Because the World Bank's
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leverage, based on financial contributions, is "severely limited" in Egypt, the Bank has
emphasized its contribution to Egypt's development through its nonlending services, such
as analytical assistance and policy advice (World Bank 1997b).
The Bank's focus in Egypt is to help support the government's goal of reducing
unemployment and increasing living standards. Food subsidy issues in Egypt are not a
direct area of World Bank work, but it has noted that improvements in Egypt's social
safety net are important in the country's war on poverty.
5.  OPTIONS FOR FOOD SUBSIDY POLICY REFORM36
The political sensitivity of food subsidies in Egypt increases the likelihood that, at
least in the near-term, the government will choose to tinker with the system at the
margins, versus embarking on any sweeping reform effort.  However, given the
inefficiencies of the system, there is considerable room for reforms that increase subsidy
resources to the needy, while improving the subsidy program's performance.  This section
describes and evaluates a number of possible policy options for further reforming Egypt's
food subsidy system.  The options emerge from the various weaknesses of the system
mentioned in this paper, ideas discussed among Egyptian policymakers and donors, and
options that have been used in the past. These particular options are those that have the
joint goals of tightening the targeting of the food subsidy system to better reach the poor
without adding significant costs. While it is impossible to precisely rank options in terms
of political feasibility, there is a widespread perception in Egypt that policy reforms
affecting the price of subsidized baladi bread and wheat flour are more politically sensitive
than those affecting subsidized sugar and oil.  Appendix Table 1 highlights the major
features of each option, which are loosely presented according to their perceived political
acceptability, from high to low.
OIL AND SUGAR SUBSIDIES37
The first three options focus on reforming the oil and sugar subsidy, since these are
widely perceived to be less politically sensitive than many options affecting baladi bread
and flour, and can still result in cost savings and better targeting. 
Option 1:  Convert High-Income-Household Holders of Green Cards to Red Cards
A two-phase policy reform might first seek to transfer some percentage of the
highest-income consumers from the green card to the red card, and later remove the red-
card subsidy.  In the longer-run, the red card itself may be eliminated, although this step
may be somewhat more politically sensitive, since people prefer the security of holding a
ration card (whether or not they use it) in case of emergency.  
The major disadvantage of a policy reform that attempts to move people from green
cards to red cards, and to eventually remove the subsidy from the latter is the fact that
members of lower income groups also hold red cards, and could be adversely affected by
such a policy reform.  This can be avoided if poor people who happen to hold red cards
can be transferred over to the green card system.  The major challenge facing
policymakers, as always, is to determine who exactly the poor and nonpoor are, in order
to avoid reducing subsidies to the needy.  
Option 2:  Bring Lower-Income Households into the Ration Card System38
  Proxy means testing is a relatively new and low cost approach that seeks to identify indicators of
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household income, and uses regression equations to determine the strength of association between indicators
and household incomes (Ahmed and Bouis 1998).
The political feasibility of policy options to increase the number of people receiving
the less-subsidized red card can be enhanced by additional policies to bring lower income
people who do not receive ration cards into the ration card system. Such policies show the
government' s desire to provide a ration-card safety net to the poorer people who
currently have slipped through the system.  Again, it is not always clear who these people
are.  It is clear, however, that the current policy of excluding newborns from the ration
card system hurts lower income groups relative to higher income groups, since poorer
households tend to be relatively larger than nonpoor households (Datt, Jolliffe, and
Sharma 1998).  Policy reform in this area requires some type of method to better locate
the poorer people, such as proxy means testing  as well as improvements in the capacity
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of the bureaucracies who run these programs to find ways of helping people to complete
the bureaucratic procedures required to procure a green card.  Taken alone, this option
results in greater targeting, but an increase in subsidy costs. Costs savings would come
into play if the option is used in conjunction with another option that removes some of the
wealthier population from the ration card system. 
Option 3:  Increase Price or Reduce Quantity of Goods Bought with Green Card39
 Five piasters is approximately 1 U.S. Cent. 
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Cost savings in the ration card system can also be achieved by increasing the price
of items bought with the green card, or reducing the amount available for a given price.
The cost savings resulting from such a move clearly depends on the level of price increase. 
This option reduces government expenditures for subsidized oil and sugar.  Another
advantage is that higher prices for ration goods will reduce the price differential between
rationed goods and free-market goods, and may encourage wealthier consumers to switch
to the latter, if the quality is higher. The downside of such a policy is that it will hurt the
poorer cardholders more than the rich cardholders. The government has increased the
price of rationed oil and sugar in the past, without any political unrest.  The price for
rationed sugar was increased in 1992/93, and that of rationed oil was increased in
1991/92, in 1992/93, and 1993/94 (Ali and Adams 1996).
BALADI BREAD AND FLOUR
In terms of baladi bread and flour, direct price increases are seen as the most
politically difficult of all policy options.  Nonetheless, the government has successfully
raised the price of subsidized bread from 1 to 5 piasters over the past 13 years.   It has
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also undertaken a variety of other gradual reforms, although not all of these are
repeatable.  For example, while shrinking the size of the baladi loaf has been one way to
reduce costs in recent years, there may be limited scope for further shrinkage, since the40
  Interview with a senior Ministry of Agriculture official, Cairo, April 15, 1998.
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loaf now weighs 130 grams.  The following five options evaluate other possibilities, a few
of which are already being attempted by the government. 
Option 4:  Mix Maize Flour into Subsidized Wheat Flour
The strategy of mixing maize flour into subsidized wheat flour for delivery to baladi
bread bakeries and warehouses has the dual advantages of reducing leakage and the cost
of wheat imports, since maize flour is relatively cheaper than wheat flour. Leakage is
reduced, because the mixed flour cannot be sifted into a higher quality, more refined wheat
flour for sale (as flour or baked goods) at unsubsidized prices. This option may also
improve targeting, since the mixed flour loaf may be less attractive to the nonpoor. This is
a strategy that the government began to implement in selected Cairo bakeries in late 1996. 
More recently, it extended this policy to subsidized flour sold to consumers through
warehouses.  
  The downside of such a policy move is the fact that a greater reliance on maize
imports may not result in a significant decrease in cereal imports, since maize prices on the
world market are not significantly lower than wheat prices.  A senior Ministry of
Agriculture official has noted that maize yields are higher, per acre, than wheat yields,
which could encourage an increase in domestic maize production, allowing the
government to buy a larger quantity of maize in domestic markets for the subsidy system.  
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However, to date, domestic maize production is not sufficient to expand this initiative
throughout the country (Ahmed, Bouis, and Gutner 1999).  
Option 5:  Increase Extraction Rate of Subsidized Wheat Flour
An increase in the flour extraction rate has the advantage of better targeting  baladi
bread to the poor.  Egyptians tend to perceive the higher extraction breads as less
attractive, which may reduce the demand for this bread by wealthier consumers. Self-
targeting is a preferred way to improve the performance of the subsidy system, because it
focuses on the incentives facing consumers, and does not require any bureaucratic
apparatus to implement.  There is further scope for an increase in the extraction rate,
which currently stands at 82 percent.  The cost involved in this includes a one-time cost of
reconfiguring flour mills.  In addition, a higher extraction rate could also result in higher
government costs, because it reduces the amount of bran that the government can sell
separately, and the selling price of bran (over LE 400 per metric ton)  is higher than the
price of subsidized flour for baladi bread (LE 290 per metric ton) (Ahmed, Bouis, and
Gutner 1999).
Option 6:  Introduce Higher Quality Subsidized Bread at a Higher Price
This option also works through self-targeting.  A higher quality, subsidized loaf
would be more attractive to those that can afford it.  Such a move is likely to reduce
wastage, and can also be a first step in a longer-term strategy to replace the 5-piaster loaf42
with the new, more highly-priced loaf.  This is the technique used by the government in
the past, to gradually increase the price of baladi bread. The act of introducing a new loaf
with no change in the price of the existing subsidized loaf would have no negative political
effects in itself.  An open question is how quality can be increased without also increasing
the cost of production.  In some cases, this may require bakeries producing bread as
instructed.  For example, the government has in the past urged bakeries to reduce
moisture levels in the bread, and to avoid undercooking it to lower energy costs. 
Option 7:  Target Baladi Bread Bakeries to Poor Neighborhoods in Urban Areas
This option calls for a greater concentration of baladi bread bakeries and
distribution outlets in poor neighborhoods, in part by reducing their numbers in higher
income communities. Again, this works by increasing self-targeting.  Richer people need
not lose subsidy benefits if they choose not to.  They can continue to buy the 5-piaster
bread at other bakeries where it is available, but will be more discouraged from doing so
because of the greater time and effort that may be involved.  The difficulty in
implementing this is in determining exactly where the boundaries are between "wealthier"
and "poorer" neighborhoods; such boundaries are unclear in rural areas, and in many cases
are also difficult to determine in urban areas. 
Option 8:  Develop an Administratively Targeted System43
 Interviews with officials from MALR, MOTS, and various donors, March, May, and June 1998.
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Perhaps the most politically sensitive option, but possibly the most efficient, is the
idea of replacing the current subsidy system for baladi bread and wheat flour with an
administratively targeted system that would work by giving poor people food stamps,
coupons, tokens, or plastic cards to use when purchasing subsidized bread or flour.  Such
a system could be an effective way to target subsidies, and by removing subsidies at the
wholesale level, it could reduce leakage and help the wheat market to function more
efficiently.  This idea has been discussed from time to time among policymakers and
donors.  However, policymakers and other social actors are uneasy about this option,
reflecting concerns about whether such a move would create social unrest.  While the
losers, in theory, would not be the poor, there are concerns that the move could be
interpreted as showing a reduced government concern for social welfare.  Many experts
and policymakers are also skeptical about the government's ability to specifically target
those who should receive the coupons or cards under a new system.  In addition, officials
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are uncertain about whether the increased costs posed by such a system would outweigh
the economic savings, particularly in the absence of widespread political support for such
an option. 
OTHER OPTIONS44
Option 9:  Reallocate Subsidy Supply Among Governorates
The idea here is that a better regional allocation of subsidies can provide a stronger
link between total benefits and total poverty rates. This option stems from EIHS survey
results that show allocations are not sensitive to poverty rates in different governorates. 
Some governorates, such as Cairo and Giza, account for greater subsidy benefits vis-à-vis
their percentage of total poverty, while others, such as Behera, Beni-Suef, Fayoum,
Menia, Assyout, Suhag, and Quena, account for 55.7 percent of poverty but receive just
under 30 percent of total food subsidies. There may be scope for revisions in the
distribution of these benefits across governorates, which would better target the poor
(Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali 1998).  In fact, with the exception of Behera, the other
governorates where subsidies are underprovided relative to poverty levels are in Upper
Egypt, where extremist political groups are concentrated.  A policy to increase the level of
total subsidies to these regions can play a role in dampening discontent by providing more
social benefits to the poor, while it has the added benefit of not involving any additional
bureaucratic procedures or creating new institutions. The difficulty with this option lies in
determining how to overcome political obstacles with implementing it, given the likely
opposition to such a plan from governorates who stand to lose some share of their subsidy
benefits, assuming the total level of subsidy benefits remains unchanged.  45
6.  CONCLUSIONS
While major reforms of the food subsidy system are not currently a high priority to
the Egyptian government, there is significant interest both inside and outside the
government for the food subsidy system to perform in a more cost-effective and efficient
manner that better targets subsidies to the needy.  The government therefore has time to
devise programs with long-term impact. 
While the options in Table 1 are listed separately, policymakers can combine some
of them to create a number of alternative bundles of policy choices.  The most politically
acceptable options—in terms of public perception—are clearly those that expand the
scope of the system to better target the needy without removing benefits from the rich. 
These are also options that will tend to increase costs, such as finding lower income
households missed by the ration card system and enrolling them. The least politically
acceptable options, in turn, are those that remove large numbers of people from the
subsidy system, including some who are not truly poor but depend on subsidies.  In
between these two extremes are the other options discussed above, of which the majority
work by influencing individual consumer's incentives systems. 
Perhaps the most acceptable options are those that combine moves to reduce the
access of the wealthy to the subsidy system while at the same time increase the system's
ability to reach the truly needy.  Taking into account the discussion in Section 2 on the
efficacy of targeting widely, removing the wealthiest beneficiaries of subsidies is less likely46
to mobilize protests, particularly when combined with measures that emphasize the
government's commitment to protecting the poor.  Loose targeting can mean retaining the
subsidy benefits for some people who may not fall below the official poverty line  (e.g.,
reduce benefits of the upper 20 or 30 percent of the wealthiest, rather than the upper 50-
60 percent of the population).  These are the packages that combine measures reducing
the benefits available to higher income groups with measures that increase the benefits
available to lower income groups.  Moves to combine and implement these policy options
should be sensitive to other issues addressed in Section 2, namely sequencing the policy
changes so that all members of the ruling coalition are not simultaneously hurt by a
reduction in subsidy benefits; and to consider policies to compensate the most vocal losers
and to directly increase the living standards of the poor. 
The choice of options also depends on how goals are prioritized. Options chosen
for their political feasibility do not necessarily coincide with those that are most cost-
effective. Options to expand the social safety net, for example, can result in increased
costs, but they can also result in reduced costs if they are taken in conjunction with other
measures to make the subsidy system work more efficiently.  In addition, policymakers
may have different sets of short-term goals versus long-term goals.  A long-term goal, for
example, may be to replace the universal subsidy system for baladi bread and flour with an
administratively targeted food stamp or coupon system, even if such a system is not seen
as politically feasible in the short run.  Short-term goals, in turn, must be placed within the
context of Egypt's far-reaching economic adjustment and reform process, and the47
important role that social safety nets such as food subsidy policies play during this
process. 
Ultimately, the government is in a comfortable position of being able to address
ways of increasing the efficacy of the system without having to do so as a result of intense
economic or external political pressure.  Food subsidy reduction is often politically
difficult for developing countries; however, even in the case of Egypt, where the issue is
highly politicized, numerous options exist that can simultaneously strengthen the social
safety net, while reforming the system so that it more effectively reaches the poor and has
a reduced impact on government expenditures.4
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Table 1—Comparison of policy options for food subsidy reform
Option Tried Political Administrative
Number Goal Pros Cons Before? Acceptability Feasibility Open Issues
1 a. Transfer some number of Better targets subsidy to poor None Yes High for (a); Proven How to identify the wealthy
wealthiest from green card Cost savings difficult for How many to move
to red card rich to com- How to administer




b. Then, in a second phase, Better targets remaining subsidy Can impact poor No Mixed for (b) Should be Level of price increase
remove subsidy on the red Cost savings people who have since some no problem Timing of policy change
card red cards poor will Whether and how to  
also be affected. publicize
To avoid this,
transfer poor from 
red to green cards
2 Bring lower income households Captures some of the poorer people May increase costs Yes High; shows Depends How to find the poor
into ration card system who do not receive green cards of system government on level of currently outside of system
Strengthens social safety net (depending on concern for government
whether higher subsidies as efforts to target





3 Increase price of goods Cost savings May hurt poorer Yes Depends on Should  Level of price increase
bought with green card May discourage some wealthier cardholders amount of be no  Timing of policy change
from using card price increases problem Whether to publicize
and timing
4 Mix maize flour with Reduces leakage at bakery Currently limited  Yes, to a High Proven Requires more maize pro-
wheat flour for subsidized and warehouse levels scope for higher limited curement from domestic
baladi bread and subsidized Decreases wheat imports maize procurement degree production
wheat flour  Cost savings  from domestic Needs research on farmers'






Option Tried Political Administrative
Number Goal Pros Cons Before? Acceptability Feasibility Open Issues
5 Increase extraction rate Better targets subsidy One-time cost of Yes High Proven Determining extraction rate




costs by reducing the
amount of bran it
can sell separately
6 Introduce higher quality 82% Improves self-targeting of 5-piaster loaf None Yes, in  Neutral Proven Timing
subsidized loaf at price above Reduces wastage transition  Whether to publicize
5 piasters Cost savings from 1-2 
Creates option of eventually phasing piaster loaf
out 5 piaster loaf   and 2-5
piaster loaf
 
7 Target baladi bread subsidies Better targets subsidy Politically Yes Medium Easy, if  How to determine where the
to poor neighborhoods in Cost savings sensitive? boundaries boundaries are between





8  Replace general bread subsidy Best way to target subsidy Politically No Low Difficult Many: costs, identifying poor,
system with targeted system, Cost savings sensitive distributing coupons, how to
giving poor coupons, tokens, Removes leakage at wholesale level Additional reimburse bakers, etc.
or plastic cards Helps wheat market to function more administrative
efficiently costs
9 Better regional allocation of Better targets to poor Depends Whether to add benefits or
subsidies so total benefits Can improve government popularity on capacity reallocate benefits
better reflect total poverty in areas that see increase in benefits of areas to How to increase capacity
rates receive where it is weak
higher
benefits
a. Adding new benefits for None High
governorates where benefits are
much lower than poverty rates;
b. Reallocating benefits from Politically Medium/low
governorates where benefits sensitive
are much higher than
poverty rates to those where
they are much lower5152
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